This paper determines the probability a large electorate will take take the correct decision under qualified majority rules. The model allows the competence of each elector to vary with the size of the electorate, thus the results represent a connection between "naive" and "strategic" Condorcet's Jury Theorems.
4 When this happens, equilibrium behavior involves the use of mixed strategy and, in this case, the probability each agent vote for the correct alternative depends on the number of agents (see Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1998) . Even when sincere voting is optimal, the probability each electors votes for the correct alternative depends on the number of electors when information acquisition is endogenous (see, for instance Martinelli, 2006 and Oliveros, 2013; Triossi, 2013) . Thus, our findings can be used as a tool by scholars interested in strategic voting. In the appendix we present a simple application to strategic voting and prove that the Condorcet's Jury theorem holds even in a strategic setup. The result provides an alternative proof to the findings of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) and of Wit (1998) 
Finally, our results can be helpful to understand the e'ect of the rational ignorance hypothesis (Schumpeter, 1950; Downs, 1957) . According to this hypothesis, electors have little information since information acquisition is costly and each elector has little probability of being decisive. This is consistent with empirical evidence (see, for instance, Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Nannestad and Paldam, 2000; Caplan 2 Other papers dealing with qualified majority rules are Nitzan and Paroush (1984) , Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1997) and Fey (2003) .
3 We also allow for heterogeneity, but maintain the assumption of independent voting. For analysis of the dependent case, see Boland (1989); Ladha (1992; ; Berg, (1993) ; Berend and Sapir (2007); Peleg and Zemir (2012) .
4 However, Ben-Yashar (2006) presents an argument in favor of sincere voting.
2 2007) and could have important implications for the quality of democratic deliberations. According to this hypothesis, we should expect individual competence to be low and to decrease with the number of voters (which decreases pivotal probabilities). Our main result implies that the Condorcet's Jury Theorem holds in majoritarian elections as long as the average competence of the electorate approaches one half at a rate that is slower than one over the square root of the number of electors. Thus, it implies hat even a rational ignorant electorate could be able to take the correct decision with very high probability (see also Martinelli, 2006 and Triossi, 2013) .
5
The structure of the paper is the following: the next section introduces the model, Section 3 presents the results and Section 4 concludes. In the Appendix, the interested reader will find an application of our results to a strategic setup.
The Model
There is an universe of voters N = {1, ..., n} and they have to decide between two alternatives A and B by a qualified majority voting. We assume that A is the correct alternative. Let ⇥ ⌥ (0, 1] be the fraction of the electorate required to choose an alternative. That is, at least ⇥n +1 electors are required to elect alternative
A.
6 If only ⇥n electors vote for A, A is selected with probability n ⌥ [0, 1]. Such a qualified majority rule is known as a ⇥-rule. The unanimity rule corresponds to ⇥ = 1 and the majority rule corresponds to ⇥ = 1 2 . Electors vote independently, but the probability each elector votes for an a alternative depends on her identity and on the number of agents. For every n ⇤ 1 and every i ⇥ n, let p in , be the probability elector i votes for alternative A when there are n agents. We will call p in , agent i's competence. Letp n be the average of
Di'erently than most literature about the Condorcet's Jury theorem, we do not assume that electors are more likely to be right than wrong, but simply that their competence is uniformly bounded below by a small positive number. Formally, we assume that there exists ⌥ 0,
for all n ⇤m.
be the probability that the elections will select the correct alternative when a ⇥-rule is used, when there are n electors and each agent votes for A with probability p in , for all i ⇥ n. We will say that the Condorcet's Jury Theorem holds if
Finally, let be the standard normal distribution:
2 dx.
The Results
First, we prove our main result.
Proof. The proof of the statement is in two steps.
. Assume that z = lim n⌅⇧ z n exists. First, we prove that
(a) We first consider the case where lim n⌅⇧ ⌃ n = ⌃. Set
A wins the elections with certainty if S n ⇤ n +1 P n i=1 pin ⇤n and wins the elections with probability n if
Thus, the probability that A wins the election is
From the Berry-Esseen theorem (see Chow and Teicher, 1997) it follows that there exists C, such that
for every x and for every n. Since lim n⌅⇧ ⌃ n = ⌃ and
The claim follows by observing that
1. First, we prove that the number of agents i voting for A with probability lower than s is uniformly bounded. Formally, we prove that there exists S > 0 such that S n = ⇠ {i | p in < r} ⇥ S, for all n. Since
= S for all n. It follows that lim n⌅⇧ z n = ⌃, thus we have to prove that lim n⌅⇧ P
Consider the following ancillary model
and lim n⌅⇧ (
= ⌃. The Berry-Esseen implies that the probability that probability that at least ⇥n + 1 agents vote for A approaches one in this ancillary model, when n ⇧ ⌃. Now observe that the probability that at least ⇥n + 1 agents vote for A can be written as p in P n P n +1 ⇥ + P n +1 , where P n = ⇣ k⇤ n ,{i1,...,i k }⌥{i k+1 ,..,in}=N \{i}
(1 p is ) and
(1 p is ) do not depend on p in and P n +1 ⇥ P n . Sincep in ⇥ p in for all i ⇥ n, the probability probability that at least ⇥n + 1 agents vote for A approaches one when n ⇧ ⌃ in the original model as well.
(ii) Finally, we prove that l exists if and only if t exists and that they coincide. We have
, where
Assume that x n > 0 for large enough n. We have z n ⇥ t n , for large n. Let {y i } i⇤1 be a sequence of real numbers, we have = ⌃, thus lim k⌅⇧ z n k = lim k⌅⇧ t n k = ⌃, which implies the claim. If x n < 0 for large enough n, the proof the claim is specular, taking in account that now
. In order to prove the general case, it su(ces to apply the previous findings to the subsequences {n 1k } k⇤1 and {n 2k } k⇤1 , where x n 1k > 0 and x in 2k < 0 for all k, respectively.
In particular, we have:
Corollary 1 The Condorcet's Jury Theorem holds if and only if lim n⌅⇧ n (p n ⇥) = ⌃.
Notice that Corollary 1 coincides with Theorem 1 in Berend and Paroush (1998) when there exists {p i } i⇤1
such that p in = p i for all i ⇥ n.
Now consider majoritarian elections which is assume ⇥ = 1 2 . Theorem 1 implies that even a poorly informed electorate can take accurate decision with high probability. For instance, assume that each elector votes for the correct alternative with probability Theorem 1 cannot be extended to the unanimity rule, which is to the case where ⇥ = 1. Indeed, Part (i), (b) of the proof of Theorem 1 does not work in this case.
⇥ ⇧ 0 as n ⇧ ⌃ and t = ⌃. Then probability of taking the right decision when there are n voters is 1
However, the probability of taking the right decision when there are n voters is 1
However, when
a) and part (ii) of the proof of Theorem 1 holds for the unanimity rule as well. Thus, we have:
For instance, this result apply when the electorate is not too smart not too stupid, which is when there exists ⇤ > 0 andn such that, for all n >n, ⇤ ⇥ p in ⇥ 1 ⇤ for all i ⇥ n.
From now on, we exclude the unanimity rule from our analysis, thus we assume that ⇥ < 1. An informal statement of the Condorcet's Jury theorem is that the result holds if the average competence of the electorate is greater than 1 2 . When a ⇥-rule is used, one should expect a similar result if the average competence of the electorate is is greater than ⇥. However, the statement is false (see also Paroush, 1998) .
Example 2 Let {x i } i⇤1 be a sequence of positive numbers such that ⇣ n i=1 x i converges. Note that
xi n which converges to zero. In this case, Theorem 1 implies that the the probability of taking the right decision approaches 1 2 .
Instead, the Condorcet's Jury Theorem holds if the average competence stays boundedly above ⇥ when a ⇥-majority rule is used.
Corollary 2 Let Assume that there exists ⇤ > 0, such thatp n > ⇥+⇤ for large enough n, then the Condorcet's Jury theorem holds.
However, the condition determined in Corollary 2 is not necessary for information aggregation.
Example 3 Let p in = ⇥ + n 1 4 for all i ⇥ n. Notice that, the hypothesis of Corollary 2 do not hold in this case, but according to Theorem 1 the Condorcet's Jury theorem holds.
We conclude this section by providing a converse of Theorem 1. We prove that for any precision level p there is an electorate that will take the correct decision with probability arbitrarily close to p.
Proof. Let p ⌥ (0, 1). Let t = Now, let p = 0 and let ⌥ (0, ⇥). For every n ⇤ 1, set p in = for all i ⇥ n. From Theorem 1, we have
Now, let p = 0 and let ⇧ ⌥ (⇥, 1). For every n ⇤ 1, set p in = ⇧ for all i ⇥ n. From Theorem 1, we have
Conclusions
In this paper we extend the Condorcet's Jury Theorem by deriving the probability that an electorate using a qualified majority rule will reach the correct decision. Since individual competence varies with the number of electors in our model, the work also connects "naive" Condorcet's Jury Theorems and "strategic" ones.
an equilibrium the probability an agent votes for B at state b is r⌅ n and the probability an agents votes for A at state A is p. Notice that lim n⌅⇧ r⌅ n = r 1+r p > 1 2 . Then, Corollary 2 implies that the probability of taking the right decision approaches one when there are many agents along sequences of such mixed strategy equilibria. This completes the proof of the claim.
